China Calls for U.S. Nuclear Cuts First, Declares Arms Control Talks Premature, Unfair and Unfeasible Without Prior Reductions
In a pointed rebuke to renewed Western pressure over nuclear disarmament, China has firmly rejected calls to join trilateral arms control negotiations with the United States and Russia — asserting that such demands ignore fundamental disparities in strategic capability and historical responsibility.
During a press briefing in Beijing on Friday, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning issued a forceful clarification of China’s long-standing position, emphasizing that “China’s nuclear arsenal is incomparable to the level of nuclear forces of the United States and Russia” — a technical, ethical, and legal reality that, in Beijing’s view, renders any insistence on parity premature, unjust, and ultimately counterproductive to global security.
The statement came hours after former U S President Donald Trump, speaking at a campaign event in Florida, expressed optimism about “denuclearization” as a shared goal, claiming he had been in active dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the matter. Trump described the prospect as a “great thing” — though no formal proposal, timeline, or framework has been publicly disclosed by any of the three governments.
Mao Ning did not directly address Trump’s remarks, but her message carried unmistakable policy weight: Before China can even consider entering multilateral nuclear talks, the United States must take concrete, irreversible steps to drastically reduce its own arsenal — and do so not as a symbolic gesture, but as a fulfillment of binding legal obligations.
The Numbers Behind the Principle
While official figures remain classified, open-source estimates by the Federation of American Scientists (2025) indicate:
The U S maintains approximately 3,700 active warheads, with over 1,700 deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched systems, and strategic bombers
Russia’s active stockpile is comparable, estimated at 4,380 warheads, with around 1,600 deployed
China, by contrast, is assessed to possess just 500 warheads, with only a fraction in active deployment — though modernization efforts, including expanded silo fields and new submarine capabilities, signal a deliberate but minimum-deterrence posture
Mao underscored that China adheres to a no-first-use policy — a commitment neither the U S nor Russia has adopted — and maintains a strictly retaliatory nuclear doctrine aimed solely at preventing coercion or existential threat.
A Legal and Moral Framework, Not Just Strategy
Crucially, Mao grounded China’s stance in international law — specifically Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which obligates nuclear-armed states to pursue “good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”
“The United States, as the world’s largest nuclear weapons country,” Mao stated, “must faithfully fulfill its special and priority nuclear disarmament obligations and further significantly and substantially reduce its nuclear arsenal to create conditions for achieving comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament.”
This phrasing is deliberate: “special and priority obligations” references decades of NPT Review Conference consensus language, affirming that the original five nuclear powers — particularly the U S and Russia, which together hold over 90% of the world’s warheads — bear unique responsibility for initiating and sustaining disarmament.
Strategic Patience Meets Rising Multipolarity
Beijing’s refusal to enter negotiations is not obstructionism — it is calibrated statecraft. Analysts note that China’s restraint serves three interlocking objectives:
Preserve strategic ambiguity: Avoiding binding limits allows flexibility in modernizing its deterrent as U S missile defense and hypersonic weapons evolve
Highlight double standards: Calling out U S demands while it expands its own nuclear triad (B-21 bomber, Columbia-class submarines, Sentinel ICBM) reinforces China’s narrative of Western hypocrisy.
Anchor to multilateralism: China consistently advocates for a five-party framework (P5) — U S, Russia, UK, France, China — rather than bilateral or trilateral formats that imply equivalence where none exists
Notably, Mao did not rule out future participation — but tied it explicitly to verifiable, asymmetrical reductions by Washington and Moscow. In effect, Beijing is demanding proof of seriousness, not just rhetoric.
What This Means for Global Stability
As nuclear doctrines harden and great-power trust erodes, China’s stance reflects a broader recalibration: the era of unipolar arms control — where smaller powers were expected to conform to frameworks designed by the superpowers — is over. Any new architecture must acknowledge hierarchy of capability and responsibility.
The ball now sits squarely in Washington’s court: Will the next administration — whether continuity or change — prioritize arms control as shared security, or as strategic leverage? Until U.S. policy visibly shifts from “bring China to the table” to “clear the table first,” Beijing’s door remains politely, but firmly, closed.
